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Book Review
Death By Choice by Daniel Maguire:

Further Comments
William E. May, Ph.D.

In the May issue of Linacre
Quarterly, William May and
Daniel Maguire debated some of
the ethical implications arising
from Maguire's book "Death by
Choice." This paper answers Maguire's rejoinder and offers another look at the ramifications of
"intentions."
In his rejoinder to my review
of his provocative study (Linacre
Quarterly, May, 1974), Professor
Maguire stresses that the distinction between the directly intended and the indirectly intended is
psychological in nature. Psycological considerations do, of
course, enter into this distinction
quite meaningfully. Nonetheless
the distinction is not a casuistic
means of helping men keep clean
consciences (something that Daniel Callahan says in his book on
abortion) , but is rather a distinction that moralists have been led
to make, as Paul Ramsey notes
quite properly, because of their
concern to be truthful to reality.
I can put it this way. Our intentions can relate identical physical activities to our moral identities in quite different ways.
To change a tire for a stranded
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motorist is a good deed if our intention is to help the motorist in
his need. To change a tire for a
stranded motorist is something
quite different if our intention is
to gain her confidence so that we
can rape her later on. Thus intention is of critical significance
in evaluation our moral deeds.
But, and this is the central
point that I want to make, our
intentions cannot make our actions mean anything at all, or
anything that we want them to
mean. There are, in other words,
some things that we cannot not
intend (in the sense that we directly and of set purpose will
them) in and through our deeds.
I submit that we ought not to intend in and through our deeds
the destruction of true human
goods, goods such as life, health,
justice, friendship, peace. But frequently in life we are, as it were,
damned if we do and damned if
we don't. That is, no matter what
we do some one is going to get
hurt, some human goods are going to get hurt, some human
goods are going to be destroyed.
I t is in these conflict situations
that the principle of proportion-
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ality and the distinction between
the directly intended and the indirectly intended come into play.
For a proportionate reason (i.e. ,
some real and realizable good)
we may do something that will,
in fact, result in evil or cause evil.
And Maguire, with McCormick,
argues that the "doing of the
deadly deed" is at times to be justified (e.g., in some instances of
care for the dying, war, abortion,
etc.) in terms of the proportionate good at stake (namely, human dignity and freedom).
I concur with Maguire that the
doing of a deadly deed requires a
proportionate reason or proportionate good. But I hold that it
require more than this - and my
problem with the position worked
out by Maguire centers on his
failure to insist on this more, for
his methodology justifies the doing of some deadly deeds (and
some that are not deadly) .that
are not, in my judgment, justifiable. This is where the distinction between the directly intended and the indirectly intended
comes into play, and it is not
merely psychological. To show
why, let us take mutilation as an
example. To mutilate a person is
to do wrong to him, for it is to destroy his physical integrity, something really good for human beings. Consider now the doctor who
amputated the leg of Teddy Kennedy's son. His act of amputation
was, if considered from a behavioral or physical perspective, directly
mutilating. Yet no one in his right
mind would rush into the operating room and command the doc224

tor to stop "mutilating" the boy.
The reason is twofold. First, the
doctor, while foreseeing infallibly
that his act would mutilate the
boy (and hence "willing" the mutilation permissively), was not
setting out to mutilate him - this
was not within the scope of his
intention. Mutilation was something that he knew infallibly
would occur, and he permitted it
to occur, for a proportionate reason: to save the boy's life. Second,
his action was itself, as Ramsey
would say, "targeted" not upon
the mutilation but upon the saving.
The same is true of some instances of doing the deadly deed:
in cases of self-defense and the
defense of others (see Summa
Theologiae II-II, 64, 7, and J .
Glenn Gray's The Warriors, pp.
51 -53). And the same is true, I
believe, in some instances when
death-dealing acts are performed
in caring for the terminally ill or
for those dying under excruciatingly painful circumstances. In
such cases the death of a human
being is not properly what one is
choosing to do in and through his
acts, nor is it what his action itself is targeted on or directed towards. In such cases one is choos-.
ing to perform, for a proportionate reason , an act that will do
some good (achieve a proportionate good) while simultaneously,
at least from the perspective of
the agent and insofar as the deed
lies within his power, effecting an
evil: death. But neither the
agent's intent nor the deed that
he does is "targeted" upon the
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death or evil that results from his
activity. And the "direction" or
" targeting" of the action is itself
not something psychological: it is
something that is, as Herbert McCabe puts it, "quasi public," that
is, something that can be objectively determined. Yet this targeting of the action is central to
understanding the difference between the directly and the indirectly intended. It is something
really there, accessible to human
intelligence. It is one of those
"circumstances" of which Maguire
speaks; it is one of the truthmaking or reality-making factors
that simply must be taken into
account in evaluating the meaning of our moral deeds and the
way they relate to our moral
being.
By contrast, some of the deeds
that Maguire would justify, for
instance, some acts of terminating the lives of the dying and of
abortion, can truthfully be described as acts of killing and as
acts of feticide ; in them one could
reasonably rush in and cry, "stop
killing that person" or "stop this
act of feticide ."
In brief, I think Maguire's approach justifies the doing of too
much evil in order to achieve
some real goods. I fear that his
approach can properly be termed
an ethics of intended good consequences (goods justifying deeds
as proportionate reasons) or an
ethics of good motivations (as op-
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posed to objectively good intentions) .
Frankly I do not think that
Maguire has responded to the
substance of my criticism of his
methodology in his rejoinder. I
submit that some of the deeds
he would justify are properly describable as directly (in a moral
sense) acts of killing, acts in
which one of set purpose must set
himself the good of life, must directly will its destruction because
his act is directly targeted on
death. On the other hand, many
of the acts that he justifies under
the rubric of suicide (e.g., the
geriatric suicide of the Eskimos)
are simply not suicidal at all,
but are truthfully self-sacrificial,
whereas others that he terms
morally acts of killing are not so
at all.
Maguire rightly notes my dependence on Grisez. But it is not
only Grisez who has led me to the
position that I take. In coming to
it I have also learned much from
Paul Ramsey, Thomas Aquinas,
Herbert McCabe, and J. Glenn
Gray. But principally, I believe
(and trust that this belief is not
self-deceptive) I take the position
I do because of reality-making or
truth-making factors discoverable
in reality. I hope that I may have
been able to point to these in my
observations and that their significance has been communicated
to the reader, whose patience I
gratefully acknowledge.
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